Abstract. It is well known that vertical integration can change an upstream producer's incentive to supply the integrated …rm's downstream rivals. However, it has not been noticed that vertical integration also changes these rivals' incentives to choose suppliers. This paper develops an equilibrium theory of vertical merger that incorporates strategic behaviors in the input market of both the integrated …rm and the (downstream) rivals. Under fairly general conditions, vertical mergers will result in both e¢ciency gains and a collusive e¤ect, and a familiar measure concerning product di¤erentiation can be used to evaluate whether a vertical merger tends to bene…t or harm consumers.
INTRODUCTION
An important issue in economics and antitrust is how vertical mergers a¤ect competition. The traditional market foreclosure theory, which was accepted in leading court cases in 1950s-70s, viewed vertical merger as harming competition by denying competitors access to either a supplier or a buyer. 1 The foreclosure theory has received strong criticism from authors that are commonly associated with the Chicago School. The critics argue that the theory is logically ‡awed, and a vertically integrated …rm cannot bene…t from excluding its rivals (e.g., Bork, 1978; and Posner, 1976 ). The Chicago School view led to a new perspective in which vertical mergers were generally considered to be competitively neutral or pro-competitive and to more favorable treatment to vertical mergers in antitrust in the 1980s (Riordan and Salop, 1995) 2 .
More recently, a new school of thought has emerged that has shed new light on the issue of the competitive e¤ects of vertical mergers. This post-Chicago approach, as is called by Riordan and Salop, combines the economic analysis of the Chicago School with the newer methodology of modern industrial organization theory. Focusing on oligopoly market structures, this new analysis has shown how the logical di¢culty in the traditional foreclosure theory can be resolved and how vertical mergers can lead to anticompetitive e¤ects in some situations. A fundamental insight of this approach is that vertically integrated …rms will have di¤erent incentives from nonintegrated ones in competing in the input (upstream) market. An integrated …rm will recognize that it can bene…t from the higher costs imposed on its downstream rivals when it refrains from competing aggressively in the input market, and it will thus try to do so to raise the rivals' costs. Vertical foreclosure can therefore arise in equilibrium. The paper by Salop and Sche¤man (1987) forms the basis for this argument, and Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990 , hereinafter OSS) is perhaps the best-known paper that pioneered the equilibrium approach to the analysis of vertical mergers. 3 In this paper, I shall argue that the new theories on vertical mergers have ignored an important point, namely that vertical integration not only changes the integrated …rm's incentive to supply inputs to its downstream rivals, but it may also change the rivals' incentives to purchase inputs from alternative suppliers. Once this is realized, an equilibrium theory of vertical mergers can be developed without some of the controversial assumptions made in the literature, and this theory can provide a framework in which the competitive e¤ects of vertical mergers are measured and compared. The basic insight of my analysis is that vertical integration creates multimarket interaction between the integrated …rm and its downstream rivals. A rival may recognize that if it purchases inputs from the integrated …rm, the integrated …rm may have less incentive to cut prices in the downstream market, which will bene…t the rival. Therefore, vertical integration can change the incentive of a downstream rival in selecting its input supplier, making it a strategic instead of a passive buyer in the input market.
I consider a model where two di¤erentiated downstream …rms use a homogeneous input produced by two or more upstream …rms: In the upstream industry, one …rm may be more e¢cient than others, in the sense that its constant marginal cost (m 1 )
is lower than the others' (m). The downstream …rms can …rst bid to acquire an upstream producer, and the remaining independent downstream …rm can counter the merger by integrating with another upstream producer. The upstream producers (including possibly an integrated …rm) then make simultaneous price o¤ers to supply to any remaining independent downstream …rm(s), which are either accepted or re-jected; and afterwards the downstream market prices are set. As it will become more clear later, this formulation follows closely the approach in OSS, but with several important di¤erences. First, in the model here the integrated …rm does not have more commitment power than an unintegrated upstream …rm in setting upstream prices.
This avoids a major criticism to OSS. 4 Second, I allow the possibility that one of the upstream producers is more e¢cient, while in OSS all upstream producers have identical constant marginal cost. Third, I allow an unintegrated downstream …rm to behave strategically in choosing input suppliers, while in OSS it is implicitly assumed that it will always purchase from the supplier with the lowest price.
Our main result is that vertical mergers occur in equilibrium if and only if m 1 < m (i.e., one of the upstream producers is more e¢cient than the others). When m 1 < m;
a downstream …rm will integrate with the more e¢cient upstream …rm; and the integrated …rm may be able to sell input to the unintegrated downstream …rm at a price higher than m: To see how this occurs, suppose that the integrated …rm and the independent upstream …rm(s) all o¤er input price m to the independent downstream …rm, as if they are Bertrand competitors in the input market (which would be the outcome if no vertical integration had occurred). The independent downstream …rm will strictly prefer to accept the o¤er to purchase from the integrated …rm, since the latter will then have less incentive to cut prices in the downstream market, knowing that its upstream pro…t will be reduced if its downstream rival decreases sales. This then enables the integrated …rm to raise the input price to its downstream rival above m. On the other hand, as it turns out, when m 1 = m; the integrated …rm will not be 4 The foreclosure result in the OSS model has been criticized for relying on the integrated …rm's additional commitment ability and otherwise the result would not be an equilibrium (Hart and Tirole, 1990; and Rei¤en, 1992) . In response, Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1992) argued that vertical foreclosure can be an equilibrium without commitment in OSS if the competition in the upstream market is modeled as a certain bidding game.
able to raise the input cost of the downstream rival.
Thus, vertical merger can cause market foreclosure by raising the rival's cost. Ironically, this happens not because the integrated …rm will refrain from supplying the rival, but rather because the integrated …rm will continue to supply to the rival. This result may appear surprising and even counter-intuitive at …rst glance, but it can become easier to understand if one realizes that …rms may compete less aggressively if they are also customers/suppliers to each other. The market foreclosure in our model is thus a consequence of tacit collusion by the integrated …rm and its downstream rival. 5 However, such market foreclosure need not raise prices in the …nal market, since vertical merger can occur in equilibrium if and only if it results in an e¢ciency gain, which can be due to either the elimination of a double markup when a downstream …rm merges with a more e¢cient upstream …rm or the direct e¢ciency gain when a vertical merger reduces the marginal cost of production in the upstream industry. Therefore, vertical mergers will involve both e¢ciency and collusive e¤ects, and this trade-o¤ is a direct consequence of our result concerning when equilibrium vertical mergers occur. We …nd that there is a simple and familiar measure to evaluate whether a vertical merger is pro-or anticompetitive: it tends to be procompetitive when the products of the downstream …rms are highly di¤erentiated and anticompetitive when these products are close substitutes.
It is quite common for a vertically integrated …rm to continue to supply inputs to its downstream rivals. Although no formal model in the literature has explored the collusive incentives identi…ed here, concerns about them have been raised by government agencies in evaluating vertical mergers. In March 1998, for instance, the US Department of Justice challenged Lockheed Martin's proposed acquisition 5 Notice that no explicit transfer payments are needed/involved here. It is the multimarket interaction generated by the vertical merger that can support collusive behavior as an equilibrium outcome in a non-cooporative game.
of Northrop, alleging among other things that the merged …rm and Boeing would be "teamed in virtually every military aircraft currently in production" and that such "increased interdependence" may lead to reduced competition (Morse, 1998 ).
The proposed merger was eventually abandoned. 6 The point of this paper, however, goes beyond to show that such concerns may have theoretical merit, in a rather unanticipated way; it also shows that such possible collusive e¤ect of a vertical merger will necessarily be accompanied by an e¢ciency e¤ect, and economic analysis can help determine how on balance consumers will be a¤ected.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describers the details of our model. Section 3 solves the equilibrium of the model and establishes the main result of the paper. Section 4 studies the competitive e¤ects of vertical mergers. Section 5 discusses alternative assumptions and robustness of our results. Section 6 concludes. Figure 1 illustrates the game.
THE MODEL
(Insert Figure 1 about here.)
The major di¤erence here from OSS is that no additional commitment power is given to F; and the identity of the supplier may matter: 10 In OSS the third stage 9 For a vertically integrated …rm, we assume that the internal input transfer price will be set at the e¢cient level, which is the marginal cost of the upstream division. 10 In OSS, it is assumed that F is able to …rst commit to a price higher than m, which then enables is actually before the counter-merger stage. But since price changes are likely to be easier to make than organizational changes, we place the counter-merger stage earlier, as is in Hart and Tirole. We incorporate the idea that the identity of suppliers may matter to a downstream …rm by assuming that it chooses its supplier at stage 3, before the downstream prices are determined. This amounts to assuming that parties can use requirement contracts at stage 3. This seems a natural assumption, albeit a strong one, in the context of our model. As it will become clear shortly, it can be mutually bene…cial for the vertically integrated …rm and its downstream rival to establish a supplier/customer relationship before determining downstream prices, and it seems likely that they will …nd a way to do so. A requirement contract is a simple way to achieve this in our static model, without involving any transfer payments. We shall later discuss the robustness of our results if contracting is not allowed and only spot transaction can be conducted in the upstream market.
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As in OSS, we assume that the demand functions for the two products in D are symmetric, namely q 1 (a; b) = q 2 (b; a):
As a preliminary step in our analysis, we …rst consider the downstream market in isolation without modeling its strategic interaction with the upstream market.
Suppose that D1 and D2 have marginal costs c 1 and c 2 . Their pro…ts then are
The Nash equilibrium in prices solves the following …rst-order conditions:
U 2 to raise the price sold to D2; causing market foreclosure. This assumption has been a source of much controversy. 11 Our result concerning equilibrium vertical mergers will still be valid with this change to our model, but the e¢ciency e¤ect of a vertical merger will then always dominate the collusive e¤ect (see the discussion in Subsection 5.2).
Assume that a unique equilibrium exists for the relevant ranges of c i ; and denote equilibrium prices and pro…ts as
In particular, p i (m; m) and p i (m 1 ; m) are given by equation (1) . By the symmetry of the demand functions, we have
We assume that prices are strategic complements, as in OSS; namely, an increase in …rm j 0 s price increases the marginal pro…t of …rm i for i 6 = j: If we were to draw a diagram placing p 1 on the horizontal axis and p 2 on the vertical axis, the reaction curves de…ned by equation (1) would be upward slopping, with the one for i = 1
That is, an increase in the marginal cost of a downstream …rm increases the prices in the downstream market.
It then follows, from the envelope theorem, that
That is, a downstream …rm's pro…t increases in its rival's cost.
We shall in addition assume:
That is, products are substitutes and demand for a product is more responsive to its own price change than to the price change of another product.
For illustration, we shall consider a linear-demand example:
measure of product di¤erentiation. Then from (1), for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j;
One can verify that both conditions (2) and (3) are satis…ed.
We note that for any given demand functions, both m 1 and m ¡ m 1 should not be too large, so that positive output will be produced and e¤ective competition exists in U . For our linear-demand example, we need m 1 < 1 and
.
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
If no vertical merger occurs at stage 1, competition among the upstream …rms means that D1 and D2 will purchase from U 1 at the equilibrium input price m or from The subgame that starts from the vertical merger of D1 and U1 will be solved using backward induction. We shall …rst characterize equilibrium in the downstream 12 Notice that as long as m ¡ m 1 is not too large; U1 will not want to charge a price lower than m: market after only D1 and U 1 have vertically integrated, then study equilibrium in the upstream market after that merger, and then consider whether in equilibrium D2
would want to counter the D1=U 1 merger by a merger with another upstream …rm.
We shall …nally solve the entire model by considering when there is vertical merger in equilibrium.
The Downstream Market with Vertical Merger of D1 and U 1
To characterize equilibrium in the downstream market when only D1 and U1 have merged; there are two possible cases to consider, depending on from whom D2 purchases inputs.
(i) D2 agrees to buy all input from an unintegrated U …rm at price w 2 .
Let the lowest price o¤ered by U 2; :::Uh be w 2 : Then, if D2 buys from an unintegrated upstream …rm, it will pay w 2 : In this case, c 1 = m 1 ; c 2 = w 2 ; and in the downstream market the equilibrium prices for F and D2 are simply p 1 (m 1 ; w 2 ) and p 2 (m 1 ; w 2 ); and their pro…ts are simply ¼ 1 (m 1 ; w 2 ) and ¼ 2 (m 1 ; w 2 ): Notice that in this case D2 interacts with F in D but not in U:
(ii) D2 agrees to buy all input from F at price w 1 :
In this case, c 1 = m 1 and c 2 = w 1 ; but now D2 interacts with F both in D and in U: Let the pro…t of F be ¼ F 1 ; and the pro…t of D2 be ¼
In equilibrium, p 
Comparing these conditions with those for p 1 (¢; ¢) and p 2 (¢; ¢) in (1) ; the crucial di¤erence is that there is now an extra term, (w 1 ¡ m 1 )
; that is not present when D2 purchases from an unintegrated …rm in U: Denote the equilibrium pro…ts
Comparing the conditions for p (5) and (6) with those for p i (m 1 ; w 1 ) in (1), since @q 2 @p 1 > 0 and prices are strategic complements, we have:
When F sells inputs to D2 at prices higher than marginal cost; it has less incentive to cut its price in D; which in turn raises both F and D2 0 s prices in D: In terms of reaction functions (curves), the third term on the left-hand side of (5) shifts to the right the reaction curve de…ned by equation (1) 
Proof.
Proposition 1 says that, for the same input price w > m 1 , D2 obtains higher pro…t by purchasing from the integrated …rm than from an unintegrated upstream …rm. This is the key insight behind the theory of vertical mergers in this paper: vertical integration changes the incentive of a rival in selecting its input supplier.
[by conditions (3) and (7)] we have:
We now de…ne w ¤ 1 to be such that
Then w By the envelope theorem, we have
which is positive if the di¤erence between w 1 and m 1 is not too large: Therefore, if m 1 is close to m; w ¤ 1 will be close to m and also to m 1 ; and hence:
which says that, within a certain range, F 0 s pro…t is higher if D2 purchases input from F at a higher price. In the rest of the paper, we assume condition (9) holds.
In our linear-demand example, w
and condition (9) holds as long as condition (4) is satis…ed.
If m 1 = m; then these conditions would be the same as those for p 1 (m; m) and p 2 (m; m) in condition (1); and we would have p 
The Upstream Market with Vertical Merger of D1 and U1
We now study equilibrium in the upstream market when only D1 and U 1 have vertically integrated. We have:
Proposition 2 In the subgame where F is formed through the merger of D1 and U 1 and no other merger has occurred, the unique equilibrium outcome is that m) ; and hence D2 would prefer to purchase from an unintegrated U …rm at a price equal to or slightly higher than m; and such a price will indeed be o¤ered: But then F can increase its pro…t by o¤ering w 1 at slightly below If D2 counters the merger of D1 and U 1 by a merger of its own with an upstream …rm, say U 2; the combined pro…t of D2 and U2 would be ¼ 2 (m 1 ; m). But since m) ; D2 and U 2 cannot bene…t from the merger. Therefore, in equilibrium, there will be no counter-merger if D1 and U 1 merge. We now state our main result:
Equilibrium Vertical Merger
Theorem 1 There is vertical merger in equilibrium if and only if m 1 < m:
Hence, from Lemma 4 above, there is no vertical merger if m = m 1 : We thus only need to show there is vertical merger if m 1 < m: We proceed as follows.
Step 1: Notice ¼ Step 2:
Step 3: 
[by revealed preference] 
Thus the merger of D1 and U 1 reduces the market share of D2:
where the last two inequalities are due to p Therefore, although it will purchase inputs from F given that D1 and U 1 have merged, D2 would prefer that no merger has occurred since its pro…t is reduced by the merger.
As in OSS and other models of vertical foreclosure, a vertical merger in our theory also raises a rival's input price and reduces its market share. In this sense there is also equilibrium vertical foreclosure. But this happens for a reason that has not been identi…ed in the literature: vertical integration changes the rival …rm's incentive to select input supplier and motivates it to purchase from the integrated …rm even at prices higher than those o¤ered by unintegrated suppliers. This in turn softens price competition in the …nal market and tends to make vertical integration anticompetitive. We shall call this the foreclosure or collusive e¤ect of vertical mergers.
While it will have a collusive e¤ect, a vertical merger in our model can occur if and only if it yields certain e¢ciency gain (m 1 < m): either the downstream …rm integrates a more e¢cient upstream producer and eliminates the ine¢ciency from double markup, or the vertical merger improves e¢ciency in the production of inputs.
In either case, the integrated …rm will face a lower marginal cost in producing the …nal good. This in turn intensi…es price competition in the …nal market and tends to make vertical integration procompetitive. We shall call this the e¢ciency e¤ect of vertical mergers.
One may think that, because of the collusive e¤ect when F sells to D2 at w 1 > m 1 ;
F should be able to sell to D2 at some w 1 slightly higher than m even if m 1 = m:
To see why this is false, notice that when D2 purchases from F at w 1 > m instead of from U 2 at w 2 = m; although D2 bene…ts from F 0 s higher downstream price, it su¤ers from its own increased input cost. When m 1 = m; the direct e¤ect of cost increase will outweigh the strategic e¤ect of softening competition, and as a result ; can be used to evaluate the net e¤ect.
Proposition 4 If
is su¢ciently small, vertical merger lowers prices in D and thus bene…ts consumers; and if
is su¢ciently large, vertical merger raises prices in D and thus harms consumers.
Proof. Notice …rst that
Therefore, since w 
is su¢ciently close to zero, w ¤ 1 could be arbitrarily close to m and we would have p ; we would have
and in this case 
DISCUSSION
We now consider several possible changes to the model to gain insights on the robustness of our results.
Quantity Competition
Suppose that everything is the same as before except that the downstream market is characterized by a homogeneous product and quantity competition. Suppose that the (inverse) market demand in D is P (q 1 +q 2 ); where q 1 and q 2 are the output choices of D1 (or F ) and D2: As before, when D is considered in isolation, let q i (c 1 ; c 2 ) and ¼ i (c 1 ; c 2 ) be Di 0 s equilibrium output and pro…t under constant marginal cost c i ; and, when D1 and U1 have vertically integrated, the pro…ts of F and D2 are
If F competes with D2 in Cournot fashion, then since q 2 is taken as given when F chooses its output in D; in equilibrium q
But these are the same equilibrium conditions if D2 purchases from an unintegrated upstream …rm at w 2 = w 1 : Therefore it is optimal for D2 to purchase the input at the lowest price regardless of the identity of the supplier, and the equilibrium input price for D2 will always be m: By standard results under Cournot competition, in equi- 
We therefore have:
Remark 1 If our model is changed so that in the downstream market there is a homogeneous product and …rms are Cournot competitors, then it continues to be true that there is equilibrium vertical merger if and only if m 1 < m; and it also continues to be true that the vertical merger reduces the downstream rival's market share and its pro…t. However, here the vertical merger always bene…ts consumers. Therefore, the main result of our analysis, that vertical mergers occur in equilibrium if and only if there is an e¢ciency gain, holds under quantity competition as well.
It also becomes clear that whether a vertical merger will lead to higher costs for rivals and collusive behavior depends crucially on whether the integrated …rm will take its rival's output as given in making its strategic decisions in the downstream market. This explains why a vertical merger has a collusive e¤ect under Bertrand or Stackelberg competition, but not in the Cournot model.
No Contracting or No Discrimination in the Upstream market
An important assumption of our model is that a downstream …rm, before setting its Another possible change to our model, which has the same e¤ect to our analysis as allowing no contracting in the upstream market, is to assume that no discrimination 14 Since the downstream prices are already set, D2 will simply purchase input from the seller with the lower price. D2 would be indi¤erent between purchasing from F or U 2 at price m; but the only strategy of D2 that is consistent with equilibrium is for it to purchase from F if m 1 < m:
is allowed in the upstream market. Suppose that a downstream …rm is required by law to purchase input from any supplier with the lowest price. 15 Then in equilibrium F will also set w 1 = m in order to sell to D2; and D2 will indeed purchase from F if m 1 < m: Therefore, the results concerning equilibrium vertical mergers and their competitive e¤ects in this case will be the same as those when no contracting is allowed. We therefore have: However, in this case the e¢ciency e¤ect of vertical mergers dominates the collusive e¤ect and vertical mergers bene…t consumers.
In equilibrium, D2 will purchase input from F at w 1 = m and the …nal prices are higher than they would be if D2 purchased from an unintegrated U …rm at the same input price; because F 0 s concern for its upstream pro…t softens competition in the downstream market. In this sense, the collusive e¤ect of vertical merger still exists.
But the …nal prices are lower than they would be had no vertical merger occurred, due to the dominating e¢ciency e¤ect.
Therefore, even if no contracting or no discrimination is allowed in the upstream market, the main result of our analysis is still valid, to the extent described in Remark 2. However, when requirement contracts can be used and downstream …rms do not have to purchase from the lowest price supplier, a vertical merger can raise the rival's cost and be anticompetitive. Notice that vertical merger still plays a key role in causing the anticompetitive e¤ects, since without it the same type of requirement 15 One may wonder whether such legal requirement is enforcable, considering that contracted prices may not be observable and in real situations the inputs provided by di¤erent producers may not be identical.
contracts or allowing discrimination in the upstream market would have no impact on equilibrium prices in both the upstream and downstream markets.
Allowing Other Contract Forms
We now change the model to consider alternative contract forms that can be used at stage 3. We shall consider two-part tari¤ contracts that may or may not be requirement contracts.
If parties can enter into a two-part tari¤ requirement contract that allows transfer payments from the seller to the buyer, then it is possible that U 1 could reach collusive outcome with D1 and D2 by making a transfer payment to them and in exchange require them to purchase input from it at some optimally chosen price w > m: This may then maximize the joint pro…ts of upstream and downstream industries. In this case, there would be no need for vertical integration. However, such a contract is essentially for an upstream …rm to use an explicit transfer payment to "bribe" a downstream …rm to purchase from it at an in ‡ated price, and it seems questionable whether such contracts are feasible in practice.
If parties can enter into a two-part tari¤ requirement contract, but the upstream …rm (the seller) cannot make explicit transfer payments to the downstream …rm (the buyer), then we have the usual form of two-part tari¤ contracts, where the buyer pays a …xed fee, T¸0; together with a unit price w; except that here there is also the additional agreement that the buyer will purchase all input from the seller. In this case, in equilibrium we will have T = 0; and all the results of our model will remain the same. This is because if (w 0 ; T 0 ) is an equilibrium contract between a …rm producing in U and a …rm in D; where T 0 > 0; the joint pro…ts of the contracting parties can be increased without making either party worse o¤ if T is reduced to zero with a proper increase in w:
If the contracts available are two-part tari¤ contracts, without required purchases, then the equilibrium outcome will be the same as if the upstream market is a spot market with linear price and the downstream …rms choose suppliers after the downstream prices are set (T = 0 in this case). The analysis in Section 5.2 then applies, and our main result holds to the extent described in Remark 2.
To summarize, we have:
Remark 3 Assume that any input supplier is not allowed to make explicit transfer payments to its customer(s). Then, our analysis is not changed by the use of two-part tari¤ contracts: when the two-part tari¤ contracts can also be requirement contracts,
all results of our model will hold; and when the two-part tari¤ contracts are not allowed to be requirement contracts, our results will be the same as those stated in Remark 2.
Comparing to Horizontal Mergers
There are obvious similarities between our model of vertical mergers and models of horizontal mergers. Our result that vertical mergers occur in equilibrium if and only if there are e¢ciency gains is closely related to the results in Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) , where equilibrium horizontal mergers can occur only if there are e¢ciency gains. The results in these two papers, however, depend on there being Cournot competition, and as Davidson and Deneckere (1985) has shown, with Bertrand competition no e¢ciency gain is needed to cause a horizontal merger. The result in our model is stronger in the sense that it holds for both Bertrand and Cournot competition. will generally lead to both an e¢ciency gain and collusive behavior in horizontal competition. We also …nd that there is a simple and familiar measure, namely the degree of production di¤erentiation in the downstream market, that can be used to evaluate whether a vertical merger is likely to bene…t or harm consumers.
In our theory, a vertical merger can raise downstream rivals' cost, not because the rivals are excluded from input suppliers, but because the merger changes rivals' incentive in selecting input suppliers. A vertical merger creates the opportunity for multimarket interdependence between competitors in the downstream market, and will thus have a collusive e¤ect. 16 However, this collusive e¤ect can be realized if and only if the vertical merger also has an e¢ciency e¤ect that occurs due to lowered marginal cost of the integrated …rm in producing the …nal product. It is generally believed in the literature that a …rm can obtain competitive advantage either by cutting its own cost or by raising rivals' cost, and only the latter type of strategies is considered anticompetitive (Klass and Salinger, 1995) . Our analysis suggests that these two strategies may be intrinsically related in some situations: a …rm can raise rivals' cost through vertical integration if and only if its own cost is reduced through the integration.
There are other approaches to the study of vertical integration. One is based on the notion of incomplete contracts, as in Grossman and Hart (1986) , Hart and Tirole (1990) , and Williamson (1985) . Another approach has focused more on problems of asymmetric information, as in Arrow (1975) and Gal-Or (1999 Figure 1 
